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On the (Re)Construction and Basic Concepts 
of the Morality of Equal Respect
Stefan Gosepath
Introduction
This chapter deals with two central problems for the thesis that all persons 
from a moral point of view are basically equals. Firstly, how can we justify 
moral equality? Secondly, about whom and with regard to what characteris-
tics do we assert moral equality? In order to answer the first question, it will 
first be necessary to contest anti-egalitarian doubts by clarifying what could 
reasonably be meant by speaking of the basic equality of all humans 
 (section 7.1). After that, it will be possible to turn to the question of the justi-
fication of basic equality (section 7.2). I offer an answer to the question why 
all persons are to be regarded as equal and autonomous by outlining a “weak” 
 constructivist moral justification, i.e. one that appeals to some prior moral 
principles and does not lay claim to a strong ultimate justification of morality 
as a whole. According to this constructivist justification, it is not a particular 
conception of justification-independent, intrinsic values which is fundamen-
tal to the concept of morality, but rather a principle of justification. This 
 principle states that norms can be regarded as justified if, and only if, free and 
equal persons, who wish to regulate their coexistence by means of such 
norms, are rationally able to agree on the norms in question. The principle of 
justification however does have a critical limitation which should and must 
be conceded: the moral stance itself cannot be derived from the justification 
principle or the contractual agreement. Instead, a normatively substantial 
concept of the moral person and of his/her “inviolability” and “dignity” can 
only be attained by reconstructing “our” morality on the basis of a kind of 
reflective equilibrium which articulates our conception of ourselves and 
 others as persons. The concept of a person with basic equality can only be 
07-Steinhoff-Chap07.indd   124 28/06/14   2:05 PM
OUP-FIRST UNCORRECTED PROOF, June 28, 2014
in: Uwe Steinhoff (ed.), Do All Persons Have Equal Moral Worth? 
On "Basic Equality" and Equal Respect and Concern, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press 2015, S. 124-141.
The Morality of Equal Respect
125
reconstructed: it cannot be constructed. Because of the “merely”  reconstructed 
nature of this foundation, there simply does not exist, in my view, a “strong” 
ultimate justification of basic equality, i.e. a justification that does not appeal 
to moral premises.
The second central question—to whom do we owe basic equality?—I try to 
answer in section 7.3 by offering a reconstruction of the moral concept of a 
person that is so crucial to our morality. The idea of morality is embedded in 
a network of beliefs as to what distinguishes persons from other living beings 
and inanimate objects, and about why these distinctions carry such great 
moral weight. Four characteristics, (i) sensitivity to pain and capacity for suffer-
ing, (ii) a conscious orientation toward the future, (iii) autonomy in general, and 
lastly (iv) moral autonomy in particular, are appropriate for helping us to 
 understand widely shared, well-considered judgments about rights and 
duties, for it is they that concern us and that we respect when we treat persons 
as  morally equal.
7.1  Two Basic Questions of Moral Equality and the Distinction 
between Two Levels of Equality
Prima facie there seem to be two intuitions which speak against egalitarian-
ism. These intuitions can be made clear with the help of two examples. Let us 
suppose—this is the first example—that we come across a small child lying on 
the pavement, wretched, emaciated, and starving. The child is obviously suf-
fering and in need of help; we see him/her and know we have to help. The 
child’s misery and suffering speak to us, cry out to us even; they distress us 
and appeal to us to act. Help in need, in order to alleviate misery and suffer-
ing—that is the humanitarian ideal. What, if not this ideal, should be at the 
center of morality or justice?1 Let us now suppose—this is the second 
example—we were to meet Mother Teresa and Hitler, or a criminal and his/
her innocent victim. Wouldn’t we treat them differently from one another 
and also respect one more than the other? If these really were our moral 
 intuitions in such cases, it would seem that equality2 has no role to play in 
them. Or does it?
However intuitively plausible cases such as these may appear at first glance, 
it is nevertheless necessary in philosophical reflection and wide reflective 
equilibrium to give a more precise definition of the individual moral claims 
of persons (such as for instance the persons in these examples) in order to be 
able to react to them appropriately. This is the beginning of the debate 
between egalitarian and non-egalitarian theories of morality, which takes 
place on two levels. On the first level, we ask what the concept of morality is 
about: is it about individual needs and deserts, i.e. nonrelational fittingness, 
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or is it about relational comparisons? On the second level, we ask about the 
appropriate conception of either nonrelational fittingness or relational 
comparisons.
On the first level, the debate is concerned with defining the general form 
and content of our concept of morality. Here the above examples seem to 
suggest that a glance at the various claims of each individual is enough to 
enable us to establish what would constitute a morally appropriate action in 
each case. This is the opinion shared by most nonrelational theories of 
 morality. As a result of this way of thinking, first-level non-egalitarians hold 
the view that equality does not play an essential or substantive role in justi-
fying claims of morality. First-level egalitarians on the other hand are 
 convinced that the legitimacy of claims cannot be morally examined and 
judged  without comparisons with other persons’ (justified) claims. On this 
first fundamental level, they assert that all human beings have the same worth, 
that they all possess equal dignity. For them, contrary to  anti-egalitarians, 
equality assumes central place in a theory of morality. This does not mean, as 
critics of egalitarianism have objected, that egalitarians necessarily regard 
equality as a supreme value in itself, albeit in connection with other val-
ues, but rather that they regard equality as a constitutive goal of morally 
right action.
First-level basic equality is understood as the assertion of the fundamental 
moral equality of all persons. Following this assertion, different persons’ fun-
damental rights and dignity are not unequal.3 This is the conception of 
 substantive, fundamental, universalist moral equality widely shared today; it 
states that every person is entitled to be treated as an equal. This means that 
in spite of descriptive differences in certain relevant respects, all persons 
should be regarded as moral equals and treated as equals, so that they are 
therefore essentially entitled to the same basic moral rights and duties. The 
principle of treatment as an equal is not the same as equal treatment; it does 
not imply being entitled to an equal share, but being treated as a free and 
equal person.4 This is the morally and politically fundamental principle of 
basic moral equality. It is based on the assumption that all persons possess 
equal dignity. Following this assumption, every person is to be recognized as 
equal from an impartial point of view.5
This concept of the equal dignity of all persons is recognized as a plausible 
(overlapping) conception by almost all currents of modern Western culture. 
Thus for example, internationally binding human rights (such as the Univer-
sal Declaration of Human Rights) which are officially recognized by many 
states, postulate equal dignity for all humans. This does not mean that this 
demand for the basic equality of all humans is in fact universally recognized; 
on the contrary, there are serious anti-egalitarian critics of equality on 
both levels.6
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Independently of whether equality can be justified as a constitutive ele-
ment of every plausible conception of morality, or whether it proves superflu-
ous, the interpretation and concretization of the central aspects of morality 
established on the first level (equality or nonrelational appropriateness) 
remain, on a second, distributive level, a point of contention between egali-
tarians and non-egalitarians. On the second level, the question is whether it 
follows from the assertion that all human beings are fundamentally equal 
that they should also be treated equally—and if so, when, where (i.e. in which 
spheres of morality), why, and in which respects. It is of course characteristic 
of egalitarianism that it attaches considerable importance to equality also on 
the second level. But depending on the criterion used to measure and judge 
just equality, theories of morality can be classified as more or less egalitarian. 
There are in fact hardly any egalitarians who advocate the criteria so often 
attributed to egalitarianism of strict equality of outcome with regard to the 
distribution of material goods, or strict equality of well-being. The moral 
inadequacies of such criteria are too obvious. A far more accurate distinction 
between egalitarian and non-egalitarian second-level conceptions of moral-
ity can be made by asking whether or not mere good or bad luck is relevant to 
distribution. As a rule, egalitarians reject the normative relevance of fate for 
distribution. Non-egalitarians, on the other hand, advocate an entitlement 
theory according to which persons are not in principle entitled to an equal 
amount; instead they might, for example, be entitled merely to enough to 
satisfy their needs.
It is possible to regard basic equality as right, i.e. it is possible to be a first-
level egalitarian and regard all persons as entitled to being treated as equals, 
and still dispute on the second level that there is any justified demand for 
being treated equally. But even a second-level egalitarian does not in fact ever 
demand the strictly equal treatment of all humans in all cases. That would be 
absurd and strongly counterintuitive. Instead, almost all second-level egali-
tarians admit justified instances of inequality or unequal treatment. It is my 
view that this occurs through a presumption of equality.7 According to this 
presumption of equality, the fundamentally equal dignity of all persons 
means that they are to be treated equally in the public domain as a matter of 
public morality unless there is good reason for treating them unequally. 
Equality is thus the default option resulting from the fundamental equality of 
all humans; the onus probandi is on unequal treatment. As I will explicate 
below only those rules can be considered legitimate to which all concerned 
parties can freely agree on the basis of universal, discursively applicable, com-
monly shared reasons. Equal consideration is thus accorded to all persons 
and their interests. In a public distribution anyone who lays claim to more 
owes all others an adequate universal and reciprocal justification. If this 
 cannot be provided, i.e. if there is no reason for unequal treatment that can 
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be universally and reciprocally recognized by all, then equal treatment is the 
only legitimate general norm. How could it be otherwise? Absent such 
 justification, any unequal treatment would mean that someone is treated as 
lower in rank, and another as higher in rank. Whoever is treated unequally 
can justifiably demand a reason for being disadvantaged. If no convincing 
reasons for unequal treatment can be brought forward, the only option 
remaining, consistent with treating persons as equals, is that of treating them 
equally. Equal treatment is therefore not merely one alternative among many, 
but rather the inevitable default that must be assumed insofar as one is to 
treat persons as equals. Second-level egalitarians are, then, of the opinion 
that humans are to be treated equally because of their equal dignity, provided 
there are no good reasons for inequality. But even from a common egalitarian 
point of view, there are a great deal of good reasons for unequal treatment, 
which vary from one sphere of morality to another.
Over and above distinguishing between two levels and establishing wide-
spread de facto consensus in spite of differing opinions, it would also be as 
well to be able to say something about the philosophical justification of fun-
damental moral equality and about its scope.8 These questions coincide with 
questions about the justification and scope of the morality of equal respect. 
This should make us skeptical as regards possible answers. In spite of constant 
debates, there is little agreement regarding the basic principles of our moral-
ity. Moral equality is as fundamental to our morality as its definition is 
unclear. To reiterate, the aim of this chapter is to provide answers to the 
 following two questions: Firstly, how can we justify moral equality? Secondly, 
for whom and with regard to what characteristics do we demand moral equal-
ity? In section 7.2 I attempt to provide an answer to the first question, why all 
persons are to be regarded as equal persons, by recourse to a constructivist 
principle of justification. The second question—to whom do we owe basic 
equality?—I try to answer in section 7.3 by delineating the moral concept of 
a person which is so crucial to our morality.
7.2 How Can We Justify Moral Equality?
7.2.1  The Program: A Reconstructive Explanation of the Justificatory 
Basis of Morality
It is held by many today that theological, traditionalist, anthropological, 
transcendental, and conventionalist attempts at justification of morality are 
to a great extent no longer plausible. Moral philosophy should therefore be 
understood primarily as an explication, as an objectively plausible and 
adequate reconstruction and reflection of our moral awareness. “Our”9 actual 
mainstream moral awareness is often framed as the conception of the 
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morality of respect, or rather of equal respect. A purely conceptual analysis 
does not seem to get us very far here. In order to be able to (fully) understand 
a moral stance, we must be capable of a reflective understanding and a recon-
structive explanation of the moral practice of those involved, in particular of 
their justificatory practice. It is necessary, then, that we provide a (critical) 
reconstruction of “our” everyday moral awareness, i.e. that we render the 
central ideas and ideals of this moral conception comprehensible in its prem-
ises, that we grasp its meaning, make explicit the complex network of reasons 
and motives on which our moral awareness and our day-to-day moral  practice 
are based, and above all, that we make use of philosophical reflection to deter-
mine whether they can lay claim to normative validity.
In my view,10 the content of “our” morality, i.e. all moral norms, rights, and 
duties, can be spelled out in terms of a basic normative procedure which it 
makes sense to call the “morality of equal respect.” (It could also be given 
another name; the main thing is to agree on how the term is to be used and 
to make sense of it accordingly.) A perhaps controversial theory implied by 
the “morality of equal respect” is that all moral norms can be justified by 
means of this one basic procedure, that is, that the norms attained by apply-
ing this procedure can cover everything of moral relevance.
Conformity with moral norms, which we demand of one another recipro-
cally, is concerned with the adequate fulfillment of individual moral claims. 
Non-egalitarians on the first level often believe they can judge the adequacy 
of individual moral claims without any process of comparison. I should like 
to dispute this by asserting that even if moral reasons are constituted by 
 people’s needs or interests rather than by relational considerations, moral 
rights and duties are still only established by what I will call the principle of 
justification, to which I turn in section 7.2.4.
7.2.2 Impartiality
To begin with, however, it is important to realize that all demands that individ-
uals make on others, requesting that their separate moral claims be adequately 
taken into account and fulfilled, are latently conflictual. If all human beings 
were in permanent agreement as to what is the morally right thing to do, mor-
ality would hardly be necessary as a social institution. However, because the 
interests and convictions of human beings are in constant latent conflict, mor-
ality is necessary to regulate their coexistence peaceably and with long-lasting 
effect by establishing a system of norms, principles, and virtues informally, i.e. 
without state coercion.11 Whichever norms, principles, and virtues a moral 
system may contain, it will only be able to fulfill its stabilizing and peacemak-
ing function if it can create a belief in its own legitimacy in those concerned, 
who will only regard a moral system as legitimate if they are of the opinion 
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that the system is not partial to their own disadvantage. Where statements 
regarding morality are concerned, there are always (moral) judgments at stake, 
which must claim to be well-founded from a perspective of impartiality accord-
ing to the standards, criteria, or rules of morality. If I say, “It is right to do x,” 
“X is good,” “I ought to do x,” or “X is worth achieving,” then I must be pre-
pared to provide reasons for my judgments which are in a certain sense objec-
tive. Moral statements in particular lay claim to a certain objectivity; the 
reasons given must also in principle be acceptable by all parties concerned. 
Otherwise they wouldn’t be justifiable to the parties but forced on them. This 
general point is also of specific relevance to statements of morality. Rights and 
duties only seem just to us if their claim that they are justified on an objective, 
i.e. intersubjective level can convince us. The first and most important condi-
tion of their objective justification is impartiality. And impartiality, which is 
thus a fundamental aspect of morality, also takes effect on two levels.12
On the first level, impartiality refers to the impartial application of a pre-
scribed norm. I will rely on the following analysis of first-level impartiality: 
A is impartial in respect R with regard to group G if and only if A’s actions in 
respect R are not influenced at all by which member(s) of G benefit or are 
harmed by these actions.13 Thus the norm R is impartially applied if A’s 
actions are guided only by the relevant general facts about the situations and 
persons involved and not by the arbitrary fact which individuals in particular 
are affected by those actions.
On the second level, impartiality is required of the rules themselves, as an 
aspect of their justifiability: purely subjective or egoistic norms or rules are 
generally considered unjust and are prohibited.14 We are prepared to accept 
that we have specific duties only if we are convinced by the claim that the 
regulations can be impartially justified. The demand for justification which is 
inherent in morality relates to this second-level impartiality.
All moral claims, therefore (including the claim to equal or unequal treat-
ment) are to be examined and justified from a perspective of second-level 
impartiality.
7.2.3 A “Weak” Moral Justification
This brings us to the central question regarding basic equality: why are all 
persons to be regarded as equals? My answer attempts to give the following 
“weak” moral justification. I call it “weak” since the justification provided does 
not aim to provide a “strong,” i.e. ultimate foundation of morality as a whole. 
The possibility of such an ultimate foundation of morality is generally con-
sidered unlikely today. Instead of looking for an ultimate foundation or 
 derivation from nonmoral premises, the following “weak” justification rather 
relies on normative premises (most importantly, the value of autonomy).
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The argument is based on a conception of persons as rational and autono-
mous agents that I hope to be quite widely shared. The individual’s interest 
in being able to exercise his or her autonomy (in the sense of  self-government) 
constitutes the ultimate basis of legitimation and the only one which must 
be respected under all circumstances. It is ultimately only those who are 
actually affected by a system of norms who can in principle support and for-
mulate their (true) interests to avoid any kind of problematic heteronomy. 
Truly autonomous, i.e. free, enlightened, and rational individuals will 
never voluntarily approve the humiliation of their own dignity (whatever 
form it may take). (I explain the role and concept of autonomy further in 
section 7.2.5.)
Moral judgments are not orders, in which a de facto private or collective 
will is expressed. Moral judgments are claims about what it is right to do. At 
a pragmatic level, to make a claim is to commit oneself to offering reasons in 
support of it. One implies that one is prepared to offer a justification (if asked 
for one) to those who would be affected by the proposed action.
Justifications whose acceptance by those to whom they are offered results 
from manipulation or coercion do not satisfy this pragmatic commitment. The 
relevant justification must therefore be free from coercion and manipulation.
In order to form a unified moral community with others, we must be able 
to approve the system of norms together by reason and deliberation, or else 
the system would be an arbitrarily imposed and perhaps even coercive one. 
Exerting arbitrary external influence (including coercion) and offering 
 persuasive justifications are mutually exclusive. They are also jointly exhaust-
ive of the grounds for norm acceptance: provided that arbitrary external 
influence including coercion is ruled out, a person can approve of a moral 
norm or principle only if that person has been convinced by what she con-
siders to be good reasons.
As explained in section 7.2.2 above the concept of morality implies the pos-
sibility of an impartial justification of moral norms. Norms can be regarded as 
impartially justified only in the case that they can be accepted by all. Thus in 
order for a moral principle to be legitimate, i.e. justified, it needs to be the 
case that all its addressees would accept it in a hypothetical situation in which 
they were free from compulsion, rather than that they would accept it under 
de facto circumstances of coercion, dependence, hierarchy, etc.
In addition, the justification must be addressed to everyone that the moral 
norms are to apply to. No one to whom the moral norms are to apply is to be 
ignored. Every individual has a “right to justification.”15 For those to whom 
the moral norms cannot be justified, those norms constitute an arbitrary 
imposition or even a coercive system.
When manipulation and coercion are absent, the reasons on the basis of 
which the norms are acceptable to all are intersubjectively shared reasons, in 
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so far as they concern this mutual justification. Nevertheless, all persons can 
also have additional reasons which lead them to agree to the norms with a 
clear conscience, such as, for example, religious convictions, which they can-
not voice openly, because they know that the convictions are not generally 
shared. Persons can and should agree on norms which can be accepted by 
everyone, even if each person may have other ulterior metaphysical convic-
tions for agreeing to the norms.
The conception of moral justification just presented has an egalitarian 
structure, since it requires that moral norms be justifiable to everyone. I will 
now comment on this egalitarian aspect in some more detail. This concep-
tion qualifies the demand for justification in such a way that “to justify mutu-
ally” eventually entails the meaning “to justify for all who have a ‘right to 
justification’ equally.”
Arguments from (epistemic, moral, political etc.) authority are insufficient, 
because they always leave one justificatory question unanswered—why 
should I accept what he or she said? There is no undisputed moral authority 
whose judgments are defined as superior. In the transition to the modern age, 
metaphysical, religious, and traditionalist conceptions of morality have lost 
their general plausibility. Thus, all sources of an impartial justification of hier-
archical, discriminatory, elitist, and exclusionist moral conceptions have run 
dry. Although this would have to be shown piecemeal for any particular 
 argument offered by its opponents, the general hypothesis seems plausible 
that these non-egalitarian conceptions cannot be justified generally and 
reciprocally today. An a priori distinction of status between (categories of) 
persons can no longer be justified impartially. All conceptions which claim to 
be able to justify such primary distinctions of status are tied to premises 
which can successfully be disputed.
For the required justification has to fulfill two conditions: First, general 
moral norms and rights are only morally justified on the one hand, if they 
can be justified reciprocally, i.e. if one person does not demand more of the 
other than s/he is prepared to concede him/herself. This is the condition of 
reciprocity. The reasons provided for the moral judgments are such as can 
allow every addressee to take the place of the person judging. This means that 
the reasons would still be accepted if the person currently judging were 
replaced by any other addressee of the relevant moral norm. Second, these 
reasons must possess justifying character with regard to the interests of all 
concerned. Everyone must have good reasons for accepting the norms in 
question; no one concerned must have overriding reasons to reject them.16 
This is the condition of generality.17
Thus a moral justification must be able to demonstrate that a suggested 
system of norms is acceptable to every individual affected by those norms, i.e. 
that no one has overriding reason to reject them. As soon as justification is 
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conceived of as egalitarian and autonomous as opposed to authoritarian, 
everyone is entitled to equal consideration in the process of justification. Only 
that which is equally acceptable to everyone can be regarded as justified. The 
conception of mutual justification requires that it be possible to demonstrate 
that the system of norms can be equally accepted by all addressees as a gen-
eral guideline for their reciprocal actions.
The system of norms which meets these justificatory requirements is the 
moral principle of the enlightened liberal morality of equal respect. It is as 
follows: a rule is morally justified if and only if, as part of a system of norms, 
it can be accepted by all addressees as a general guideline for their actions for 
reasons which are in equal measure general and reciprocal, forming the basis 
for a generally accepted agreement reached without coercion or manipula-
tion. This moral conception is a morality of equal respect since it grants all 
persons an equal status in the procedure of justification. Equal status follows 
from such a justification procedure since there are no reasons we know of to 
assign unequal status to different but autonomous individuals that would be 
acceptable to all, i.e. even those to whom an inferior status should be assigned. 
Nobody would autonomously accept his or her own degradation. Thus 
unequal status (at the first of the two levels of equality distinguished above) 
is ruled out by the requirement to generally and reciprocally justify all norms 
to those affected who are regarded as autonomous.
In addition (and already alluded to above, in my discussion of second-level 
equality) a presumption for equal treatment holds. If no general and recipro-
cal justifications for unequal treatment on the second level can be provided 
that are acceptable to all autonomous equals then equal treatment is the 
default option. If there is no reason for unequal treatment that can be univer-
sally and reciprocally recognized by all, then equal treatment is the only 
 legitimate norm. Any unequal treatment without good reason would mean 
that someone is treated as of lower status, and another as of higher status, 
which would violate the equal status established on the first level.
In the next two sections I will spell out two central tenets of the liberal 
 morality of equal respect in more detail: the principle of justification in 
 section 7.2.4 and the respect for the autonomy of each person in section 7.2.5. 
In section 7.2.6 I will return to the anti-egalitarian challenge and show how 
it can be rebutted by appeal to this justification of the liberal morality of 
equal respect.
7.2.4 Principle of Justification
A person does not show another the required respect if s/he responds to a 
request for justification in a way which s/he knows or has reason to suppose 
cannot be accepted by the other person. All intersubjective regulations must 
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be justified by recourse to principles which can be accepted as justified by all 
free, autonomous, and equal persons. What is fundamental to the concept of 
morality is not therefore a particular understanding of independent, intrinsic 
values, or a theory of the good but a principle of justification. Norms can only 
be regarded as justified, if free and equal persons who wish to regulate their 
coexistence by means of norms are rationally seeking regulations to that end 
and are able to agree on the norms in question.18 This fundamental principle 
strengthens the idea of impartiality, so that it ends up by asserting that in the 
case of impartial, interpersonal regulations, or regulations of distribution, 
the persons concerned or their essential interests must receive equal weight-
ing and equal consideration in public affairs.
Since respect for the autonomy of each person implies that it is morally 
wrong to force someone to do something of which s/he is not convinced in 
principle (i.e. not necessarily de facto) and which s/he cannot therefore accept, 
it is only those reasons which s/he can accept in principle which grant the 
moral right to treat that person in accordance with those reasons. The 
 qualification “in principle” should make clear that the criterion for moral 
correctness is ultimately bound to a hypothetical agreement. De facto convic-
tions and reactions in real situations are not sufficient conditions for moral 
legitimation, because they could have originated under pressure, or as a result 
of false information, a lack of reflection, irrational considerations, or unen-
lightened interests. What is required is the approval of regulations which 
those concerned would give under the idealized circumstances of freedom 
from the pressure of others and autonomy, i.e. reasoned consideration and 
decision-making based on free, enlightened, and rational opinions and 
desires—whether or not they would actually consciously approve them in 
reality. Unfortunately it is only possible to make a hypothetical investigation 
into whether all persons could have reciprocal and general reasons for approv-
ing a regulation. In actuality, we are almost never in a situation where all 
concerned can in fact be asked under circumstances of freedom, equality, and 
autonomy. Usually, some of those concerned cannot be asked at all, while 
others are not free or autonomous enough. In moral philosophy therefore, it 
is inevitable that we work with an idealization, as long as it is a criterion for 
moral legitimacy that reasons be approved in principle.
7.2.5 Respecting Autonomy
The principle of justification directs morality to a procedure by means of 
which the necessary steps for the just formation of social coexistence are to 
be developed. Morality, or rather the moral outlook of those actually con-
cerned is not derived from the principle of justification—for in that case the 
construction would be laid open to legitimate criticism.19 Thus morality is 
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not constructed by help of the justification principle all the way down. The 
prerequisite for the justification principle is a certain moral outlook of respect 
for the autonomous decisions of other persons. This moral conception lays 
the stress on the existential primacy of the individual and on the overriding 
value of each person’s rational capacity for autonomy.
In a negative dimension, respect includes the prohibition of the instrumen-
talization of others. This corresponds with the condition expressed in Kant’s 
second formulation of the categorical imperative, that we “treat [. . .] all others 
never merely as means but always at the same time as ends in themselves.”20 
Others are used as means, Kant specifies, if they cannot approve their treat-
ment.21 Thus in a positive dimension, respect is connected to the ability to set 
oneself goals and objectives and to reflect on them critically, i.e. to have one’s 
own good reasons for approving or rejecting a regulation. The object of equal 
and mutual respect is the autonomy of every individual who, as a result of his 
or her supposed autonomy, is conceived of as a  “self-authenticating source of 
valid claims.”22 What equal concern and respect must refer to, can therefore 
only be the considered interests of every autonomous individual. It is ulti-
mately only those who are actually concerned, who can  support and formu-
late their (true) interests.23 Only the individuals  themselves can and may 
decide what is in their own “best,” “enlightened,” “rational,” and “true” 
interest.24 It is entirely up to the individuals to decide which interests they 
wish to assert. To begin with, all interests are admitted to the process of justi-
fication; subsequently, all morally inadmissible  preferences (e.g. “egoistic” or 
“external” desires,25 such as for instance that the interests of one’s neighbor 
be ignored) are filtered out, because they go against the conditions of equality 
inherent in the justification process. All other  “personal” interests are prima 
facie morally admissible, provided no one has good reason to  dispute them 
during the process of justification. Thus there are no other prior, absolute, 
nonprocedural moral criteria for (in)admissible interests.
In this way, autonomy assumes a special status within the morality of equal 
respect. For it is ultimately autonomy which we respect. It is autonomy which 
provides the circumstances which make justification possible in the first 
place. Individual autonomy is the central (although not the only) value of the 
enlightened liberal morality of equal respect. From the point of view of the 
morality of equal respect, autonomy, or rather an autonomously led life is of 
value, and it is of equal value to the life of each individual person.
Autonomy as self-determination means among other things not being 
defined by others, which in turn means not being controlled without sufficient 
justification, and not simply being ignored without good reason. This can 
assume more or less drastic form, from forms of social exclusion to physical 
torture, but structurally the crux of the matter remains the same: a person who 
is owed justification for the way in which s/he has been treated is not being 
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taken seriously; rather s/he is being ignored, as if s/he were not an equal person 
or even not a person at all. Kant has termed this, “the worthiness of every 
rational subject to be a legislating member in the kingdom of ends.”26 Being a 
legislating member of this kind means not being ignored by the law, and know-
ing not to ignore others, i.e. it means that one is oneself subject to the law.
7.2.6 Rejecting the Anti-Egalitarian Challenge
With the help of, first, the above mentioned (in section 7.1) distinction 
between two levels in the debate about equality and between two correspond-
ingly different kinds of assertion of equality; second, a justification of the 
perspective of impartiality (in section 7.2.2); and third, the principle of justi-
fication (in section 7.2.4), serious anti-egalitarian misunderstandings can be 
avoided when dealing with questions of morally adequate treatment.27 For, 
whether first-level or second-level, an anti-egalitarian must not take such 
obviously intuitively plausible examples of justified unequal treatment as 
proof that first-level egalitarianism is ungrounded.
(a) From the perspective of impartiality, all individuals are at first equally 
entitled to justification. The application of the principle of justification can 
however result in different entitlements proving justified on the second level.
Thus, it may be right from a moral point of view to treat Mother Teresa and 
Hitler unequally and to ascribe them with unequal moral worth (for socie-
ty?). However it does not follow that they are not entitled to equal dignity on 
the first level in the sense of having an equal “right to justification.” In the 
example above, it is simply assumed obvious that it is morally appropriate to 
treat Mother Teresa and Hitler differently—or a guilty person and an inno-
cent one, etc. But in everyday life, impartial examination is precisely what is 
required in such a case, because the results of impartial examination should 
not simply be assumed or anticipated. In a justification procedure among 
autonomous equals unequal treatment can be justified if general and recipro-
cal reasons can be given for it that are acceptable to all. This would be the 
case, for example, if persons were to agree that criminals should be treated 
differentially (say, subjected to punishment). In the example Hitler would 
not be able to just veto proposals he doesn’t like unless he could give better 
general and reciprocal reasons for a different norm he would propose. For as 
explicated above, if no general and reciprocal reasons for unequal treatment 
can be given, equal treatment is the presumed default option.
This means, however, that the plausibility of non-egalitarian intuitions is (also) 
based on the principle of justification, for such plausibility must claim to be able 
to make use of good reasons, i.e. reasons which are acceptable to everyone, to 
demonstrate which criteria justify a claim to what kind of unequal treatment.
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Which claims can be regarded as appropriate, and which criteria or  qualities 
can qualify a person as bad or good, can only be determined in a consistent 
and nonparticularist way, i.e. impartially, if we ask whether the claim in ques-
tion could be approved by all concerned under hypothetical conditions of 
freedom and equality. Such a principle of justification is all the more neces-
sary, the less evident and the more unclear or contentious it is whether or not 
we are really dealing with suffering, hardship, or objective need. Moral rights 
and duties can only be determined by means of general and reciprocal justifi-
cation. The principle of justification is constitutive for morality. It must be 
defined more closely for modern morality in such a way that every person 
concerned is given equal weighting. The basic constellation is an egalitarian 
one: every person (who belongs to the relevant context of distribution) has 
an equal “right to justification.” But this makes it clear once again that moral 
claims can only be justified on a basis of fundamental moral equality, so that 
this principle is by no means dispensable.
(b) The second egalitarian objection to first-level non-egalitarianism is that every 
definition of moral claims must be relational. For morality is concerned with 
what actions (or omissions) we owe to whom for what reasons and (distributive) jus-
tice (as a central part of morality) is concerned with the question of which claims 
to which goods are to be justified to whom and with which reasons. Precepts of moral-
ity, including principles of justice, are always concerned with a person’s fair 
share, and this can only be determined in the process of justification. The pro-
cess of justification must be applied separately for each good which is to be dis-
tributed, so that in the case of some goods (e.g. food) it is less comparative 
grounds which play a role, while in the case of others (e.g. reputation)28 it is more 
socially related reasons. Morality including justice is relational in as far as there 
are no “absolute” arguments, but only such as could be approved by free and 
equal persons. It is in the necessary recourse to the principle of morality includ-
ing justice that the necessity of relating to others as equals becomes evident.
The critique of non-egalitarianism can, then, be summed up as follows. In 
order to determine the morally appropriate way to act, it is necessary to fall 
back on relational principles of morality and justice. To begin with, morality is 
relational in the sense that it always calls for the general and reciprocal justifi-
cation of claims. It is also relational in a second sense, because it is always con-
cerned with establishing or applying general rules, so as to ensure that equal 
cases are treated equally. And finally, morality is relational in a third sense, 
because in defining morality, it is necessary to make comparisons among 
 persons and their claims and resources. Human beings are morally entitled to 
support only to such an extent as is considered appropriate according to generally 
justified opinion with regard to the circumstances, i.e. relative to the quantity 
of resources available and to the possible claims of others on those resources.29
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7.3  For Whom and with Regard to What Characteristics 
Do We Demand Moral Equality?
7.3.1 Person
What characteristic or rather what particularity of human beings is it which 
inspires us with respect and has us talk of human dignity?30 A reconstruction 
of “our” morality is not possible without a normatively substantial concept 
of the moral person and of his or her “inviolability” and “dignity,” a concept 
which shapes our understanding of ourselves and which we are prepared to 
grant one another mutually. The idea of morality is embedded in a network 
of opinions about what distinguishes persons from other living beings and 
inanimate objects, and why those distinctions carry such great moral weight. 
The characteristics I shall name are suitable for helping us to understand 
widely shared, well-considered judgments about rights and duties, for it 
is  they that concern us and they we respect when we treat persons as 
morally equal.
These characteristic attributes can be determined by clarifying the abilities 
which a being has to possess if we are to be able to grant him/her the rights 
and duties which are part of the universally shared core of our morality. The 
connection between morality and certain personal capacities is made clear in 
the following model:
 (i) Firstly, beings which have no feelings, feel no pain, no fear, and no 
despair are not capable of suffering. It is not therefore possible to inflict 
suffering on them. Sensitivity to pain and capacity for suffering constitute 
therefore the first stage of conditions which beings must fulfill in order 
to be treated morally, i.e. in such a way that pain and suffering are not 
inflicted on them without particular reason. This corresponds with our 
moral intuition. On the other hand, a class of beings which possess 
only those capacities can hardly be attributed exactly the same moral 
status as persons whose capacities are on a higher level.
 (ii) Secondly, the only beings who have an independent right to life are 
those who have a concept of their own future, and who are capable of 
developing for themselves a conception of a good life and following 
that conception—this means that they are in a position to plan to a 
certain extent, and that they are normally also capable of carrying out 
their plans. Beings without an orientation toward the future are not 
being done out of anything if they are painlessly killed. Nothing can 
have moral value if it does not also have personal value for someone. 
Beings without an orientation toward the future cannot regard their 
own life as possessing any personal value.31 Provided they have no 
developed consciousness, they can have neither future-oriented 
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desires nor the concepts of future necessary for forming such desires. 
However it is an orientation toward the future which constitutes the 
morally relevant basis for the prohibition of killing. Even if it is 
 painless, killing is morally prohibited, if and because it violates the 
momentous interests of those concerned. A conscious orientation 
toward the future constitutes thus the second-stage capacity for beings 
which are to be morally treated in such a way that both their right to 
live and further related rights are respected.
 (iii) Thirdly, freedom and self-determination only possess meaning for 
beings who are equipped with self-awareness and a sense of autonomy 
and who also aspire to be autonomous.32 For them, the capacity and 
need for autonomy constitute the basis for a sense of their own digni-
ty. Their capacity and need for autonomy also form the basis for their 
sense of responsibility that is central to morality. It is because of this 
that autonomy (including self-awareness) constitutes the third-stage 
capacity for beings who are to be treated morally in such a way that 
their interests are taken into account when it is being determined what 
is morally permissible. Persons must develop and exercise this capacity 
in order to be truly independent and free. Thus in its full sense, auton-
omy is not a purely natural predisposition, but also a duty (a require-
ment of reason).33
 (iv) Fourthly, the conception of reciprocity (i.e. the idea that one owes 
something to others just as one is owed something by others) only 
makes sense in the case of beings who conceive of themselves as full 
members of the moral community, and who thus want not only to be 
well-treated themselves, but also to live together with others peace-
fully, cooperatively, and morally, and so seek moral norms to shape 
their coexistence in a way that is moral and just. What characterizes 
persons is not just the fact that they have interests, but also that they 
are capable of ignoring those interests. This corresponds with Kant’s 
famous view that man’s dignity is justified by his moral autonomy: 
“Thus, man had attained a position of equality with all rational beings, 
whatever their rank (III, 22), because he could claim to be an end in 
himself, to be accepted as such by all others, and not to be used by any-
one else simply as a means to other ends. This [. . .] is the basis of man’s 
unconditional equality.”34 This idea encompasses not only our ability 
to set ourselves objectives in accordance with our own conception of 
what is good, but also our ability to use the demands of morality to 
influence the choice of our goals and the actions we direct at those 
goals, i.e. our ability to be our own lawgivers. It is only with this fourth-
stage criterion that we reach that not uncommon conception 
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of morality as that which, with reasons, we owe one another and are 
prepared to grant one another. Only beings with this sense of morality 
can themselves assume obligations as the result of reasoning. The only 
beings who can do that are those who possess the ability to judge the 
way they are treated as appropriate or inappropriate, just or unjust.35 
Only then can our moral sanctions, such as guilt, outrage, or rebuke, 
take effect; they would otherwise make no sense. A moral stance is the 
fourth and highest condition which beings must fulfill in order to 
belong fully to a community whose members treat and respect one 
another mutually as persons. Persons, then—and this is particularly 
crucial from the point of view of morality—have a sense of morality 
and justice. Not only do they themselves have moral rights; they also 
have corresponding duties to one another. The moral relationship 
between persons is therefore symmetrical; the members of this class 
grant one another mutual rights and duties; only persons are at one 
and the same time moral actors and moral addressees.
In my opinion, these four stages correspond best to our reasoned judg-
ments as to why we have moral duties to others.36
7.3.2 Human Dignity
Equal moral respect refers to what is respected; it refers to individual 
 autonomy. Instead of defining enlightened liberal morality as a morality of 
universal equal moral respect, we can also conceive of it as a morality of 
respecting individual human dignity. This is a reference to the equal funda-
mental status which persons must grant one another mutually, if they are to 
consider one another reciprocally as equals, because an unequal status  cannot 
(any longer) be justified. Under the objectivizing and vague talk of equal 
(human) dignity we are to understand that everyone is entitled to equal respect, 
that autonomy must be respected, and that the regulations must be justified 
in a way that is in principle understandable to everyone, so that everyone is 
taken into consideration whenever the regulations concern him/her. In this 
way, human dignity is a function of other moral convictions. Its violation 
means that something is to be regarded as seriously morally wrong for inde-
pendent reasons. Those independent reasons consist in the violation of moral 
equality or the justification principle.
Equal (human) dignity refers to the outlook of equal respect which we owe 
people; it means that everyone must be taken into equal consideration in 
their basic moral rights. This does not rule out the possibility that people 
may, under certain circumstances, be granted various specific values such as 
honors and recognitions, to a varying degree, without the principle of equal 
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respect to all people being violated—in such cases, that is, where unequal 
treatment can be justified by invoking equal moral value. Fundamental equal 
dignity is not gradational. Various other honors or values are however grad-
ational, because they are an expression of merits based on gradational qual-
ities (such as talents, abilities, character, or personality) or on status.37 
Correspondingly, we speak of individual esteem in terms of something which 
refers to merits and is therefore gradational. Moral respect, however, is defined 
as a categorical concept which does not allow for any variation in degree. 
Moral respect does not refer to any merit, not even moral merit. In this 
respect, and only in this respect, does “human dignity” resemble love, which 
is not dependent on merits or abilities either, but rather relates to the individ-
ual as the actual bearer of all his/her positive and negative properties. But love 
is particularist; it relates to a few people who possess a special meaning for the 
one who loves. Respecting someone, on the other hand, is universalist, and 
means respecting him/her equally, as much as we respect every other person. 
But dignity is not a valuable, nongradational quality which all people possess 
equally; rather it is an outlook, an outlook of respect, which we show persons 
who excel as a class as a result of certain characteristics. The characteristics do 
not themselves justify equal human dignity.38
Attempts to obtain and explain moral equality using the concept of the 
equal dignity of human beings39 are not very promising, because the concept 
itself is empty and requires a moral conception to lend it substance.40 The 
concepts of “dignity,” “moral equality,” “humiliation,” and “degradation” 
refer to one another mutually. We would therefore be going round in circles 
if we were to obtain the morality of equal respect only from the explication 
of one of these concepts. Respect for individual human dignity shows itself 
precisely in respect of individual rights, to which every person is equally 
entitled. The moral content of these rights can only be determined by apply-
ing the process of justification to all people equally. It must be applied to all 
people equally, because there is no acceptable generally and mutually shared 
reason for unequal treatment in the process of justification itself.
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 23. Narveson (2003a).
 24. Narveson (2002), pp. 203–225.
 25. Cavanagh (2002).
 26. Cavanagh (2002), p. 174.
Chapter 7
 1. I take justice to be an essential part of morality. In the following I will always use 
the term ‘morality’ as the broader inclusive concept.
 2. On the definition of the concept, see Gosepath (2007).
 3. In Rousseau (1997) we find the expression “égalité morale,” which he contrasts 
with “égalité naturelle” or “égalité physique” and uses to refer to the equality of 
all people as constituents or participants of the “volonté générale.”
 4. Cf. Rawls (2001) § 7, who prefers to speak of the “idea of free and equal 
persons.”
 5. On this well-known distinction and formulation, cf. Dworkin (1977), pp. 179–
183; p. 277. “Treating as equals” or “equal concern and respect” are auxiliary 
constructions which require interpretation. Taken alone, the expression “treat-
ing as equals” explains little, because it is possible to imagine several ways of 
concretizing or proceduralizing it: cf. Feinberg (1973), p. 93. Thus “treating as 
equals” is an elliptical expression, in which the second part of the relationship is 
simply omitted. In full, it would have to read: all descriptively different persons 
who come under this norm are to be treated as equals in a certain respect. This 
could refer to human dignity, needs, etc. The expression “equal concern” is also 
ambiguous: someone who feels that his/her special entitlements have been 
ignored, regards him/herself as unequally considered. Cf. Tugendhat (1997), pp. 
79 f. The same applies though to a person who, following traditional morality, 
alleges that s/he deserves unequal dignity, and feels unequally considered when 
distribution is equal. A single standard is therefore necessary to equal concern. 
Incidentally, Dworkin wants the idea that people must be treated as equals to be 
understood not as constituting a general moral demand, but rather as a demand 
on the state. Cf. Dworkin (1999), pp. 15–126, esp. p. 50; Dworkin (2011). Cf. by 
contrast my arguments in this chapter and in Gosepath (2004), ch. II, 5.3.
 6. Cf. the different views of Anderson (1999), Frankfurt (1987), Hayek (1960), Kerst-
ing (2002), Letwin 1983, Lucas (1977), Lucas (1971), Narveson (2002), Pojman 
(1997), Raz (1986), ch. 9, Steinhoff (chapter 8 of this volume), Westen (1990).
 7. Cf. For a full account and defense of the presumption of equality see Gosepath, 
“The Presumption of Equality,” in: Carina Fourie, Fabian Schuppert, Ivo Walli-
mann-Heimer (eds.), Social Justice, Oxford: Oxford University Press (forthcom-
ing) and Gosepath (2004), ch. II. 8. The presumption in favor of equality can be 
justified by the principle of equal respect together with the requirement of uni-
versal and reciprocal justification (as explained below).
 8. This is disputed by Nielsen (1988), pp. 55–71, who believes he can conduct a 
defense of moral equality with the sole assistance of the method of wide reflec-
tive equilibrium.
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 9. From an empirical point of view, the scope of this “we” should remain open.
 10. I defend this idea at greater length in Gosepath (2004), ch. 5.
 11. I have borrowed this functional definition of morality from the classic sociologi-
cal studies of morality.
 12. Cf. Barry (1995), p.11; Gert (1998), ch. 6.
 13. This is the definition given by Gert (2001), pp. 599–600 and Gert (1998), p. 132.
 14. Barry (1995), p. 11, calls it “second-order impartiality.”
 15. Cf. Forst (2012).
 16. Cf. Forst (2002) and (2012). It is well known that the more precise conditions of 
the moral criterion of generalizability are differently characterized by different 
advocates of a deontological-liberal conception of morality. However, one impor-
tant difference between the various philosophical theories has to do with the 
type of idealization. Cf. Kant (1997a); Rawls (1971); Scanlon (1998), esp. ch. 5; 
Habermas (1990); Ackerman (1980), esp. ch. I. These justification-based views are 
confronted with criticisms such as those brought against discourse ethics in 
Steinhoff (2006a). Unfortunately I cannot adequately deal with those criticisms 
within the confines of this chapter.
 17. For an explication of the concept of justification see Steinhoff (2000).
 18. Cf. Scanlon (1982), pp. 103–128.
 19. Cf. my criticism of contract theory in Gosepath (1992), ch. VI. 2., pp. 325–342.
 20. Kant (1997a), p. 41.
 21. Kant (1997a).
 22. Rawls (1993), p. 32.
 23. Cf. Wingert (1993), pp. 90–96 and passim.
 24. On the concepts of “best,” “enlightened,” “rational,” and “true” interests and on 
the differences between them and constructive ways of interpreting them, cf. 
Gosepath (1992), ch. VII. 4 & 5.
 25. On the distinction between “personal preferences” and “external preferences,” 
cf. Dworkin (1977), pp. 234 ff. and 275 ff.
 26. Kant (1997a), p. 46.
 27. Cf. the examples cited at the beginning of section 7.1.
 28. Some parts of our everyday morality can only be adequately reconstructed in 
terms of protection from relational violation. This is, above all, the case in the 
important area of disregard. Not being greeted by an acquaintance, for instance, 
counts as disregard in our society, but it is only in the context of the fact that 
others are greeted as a sign of politeness that this is understandable and justified. 
A feeling of disregard is always relative to the acknowledgement enjoyed by other 
persons.
 29. Efficiency should also be taken into account. For inefficiency implies waste, and 
if there is waste, then something which could have been distributed is arbitrarily 
withheld from those entitled to it.
 30. Cf. Quante (2002) and Quante (2007).
 31. Cf. Tugendhat, López, and Vicuna (2000), ch. 1.
 32. I do not understand “autonomy” in the narrow sense used by those following 
Kant (e.g. Habermas), but in a much wider sense to mean personal autonomy in 
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the sense of general personal self-determination about how one wants to live 
one’s life.
 33. Frankfurt’s (1971) characterization of persons as beings who have second-order 
volitions helps to determine the criteria for referring to a person as autonomous 
and rational. For such a description, cf. Gosepath (2004), ch. VII. 2, pp. 346 ff.
 34. Kant (2003), p. 226.
 35. Cupit (1996), pp. 16–18.
 36. This four-stage catalogue of characteristics does however seem to possess some 
disadvantages which ought to be discussed. Because it fixes certain mental and 
cognitive performances as constitutive to being a person, the four-stage model 
has the obvious disadvantage of not coinciding with our widespread intuitions 
about fetuses, infants, and severely disabled people. These beings fulfill at most 
the conditions of the first stage; whether they fulfill the conditions of the second 
stage is questionable, and they quite clearly do not possess the capacities neces-
sary for the third and fourth stages. It can however also be seen as an advantage 
of the gradational model that it enables us to admit and explain gradations in 
moral status. These beings are thus strictly speaking members of the moral com-
munity, because persons have duties towards them. But they do not possess 
rights of their own, and the duties owed them are not as extensive, as they are not 
full members. This seems contraintuitive to many, who would grant fetuses and 
permanent coma patients at least the right to live.
 37. Vlastos (1984) attempts to use this distinction to justify equal dignity.
 38. Cf. Feinberg (1973), pp. 93f.
 39. Cf. Miller (1982), pp. 78–83; Scanlon (1996), part III.
 40. Thus Schopenhauer (1995), p. 100, criticized the fact that this expression 
“became the shibboleth of all the perplexed and empty-headed moralists who 
concealed behind that imposing expression their lack of any real sense of morals, 
or, at any rate, of one that had any meaning.”
Chapter 8
 1. Waldron (2002), p. 3.
 2. Waldron (2002), p. 4.
 3. Waldron (2008), esp. sections 8–11.
 4. See Kekes (2007), pp. 65–70.
 5. Miller (2007), p. 28.
 6. Kymlicka (1989), p. 40. The entry “Equality” (authored by Stefan Gosepath) in 
the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, normally an immensely useful and bal-
anced resource, also succumbs to this error. Contemporary critics of “moral 
equality” are not mentioned (in an encyclopedia entry!); instead, the reader is 
assured that any position denying moral equality “will not be found plausible 
today.” As evidence for this claim Gosepath refers to other egalitarians. See Gose-
path (2007).
 7. Kekes (2007). As this volume shows, Sher might meanwhile object to being put 
into the anti-egalitarian camp.
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